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Abstract
Proxy blind signature combines both the properties of blind signature and proxy
signature. In a proxy blind signature scheme, the proxy signer is allowed to
generate a blind signature on behalf of the original signer. It is a protocol played
by three parties in which a user obtains a proxy signer's signature for a desired
message and the proxy signer learns nothing about the message. During the
verication of a proxy blind signature scheme, the verier cannot get whether
signing is within the delegation period or after delegation period. In this thesis
a time stamped proxy blind signature scheme with proxy revocation is proposed
which records the time stamp during the proxy signing phase and satises all the
security properties of proxy blind signature i.e distinguishability, nonrepudiation,
unforgeability, veriability, identiability, unlinkability, prevention of misuse.
In a proxy revocation scheme, the original signer can terminate the delegation
power of a proxy signer before the completion of delegation period. Proxy blind
signature has wide applications in real life scenarios, such as, e-cash, e-voting and
e-commerece applications.
Keywords: Proxy Blind Signature, Proxy Signature, Blind Signature, Proxy Revocation, DLP
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A digital signature is an authentication mechanism that enables the creator of a
message to attach a code that acts as a signature. In short, it has the same function
as that of a handwritten signature. Digital signatures provide even more security
than their handwritten counterparts. A valid digital signature gives a recipient
reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender, such that the
sender cannot deny having sent the message (authentication and nonrepudiation)
and that the message was not altered in transit (integrity). A digital signature
scheme typically consists of three algorithms:
1. A key generation algorithm that selects a private key uniformly at random
from a set of possible private keys. The algorithm outputs the private key
and a corresponding public key.
2. A signing algorithm that, given a message and a private key, produces a
signature.
3. A signature verifying algorithm that, given a message, public key and a
signature, either accepts or rejects the message's claim to authenticity.
But the problems of digital signature come when the signer got the details
about the user during transactions. A tremendous amount of data about a user's
habits, aliations, and lifestyle whereabouts can be captured by the signer in
electronic form. This breaches the privacy of the person in concern. Organizations
1
Chapter 1 Introduction
now have massive amounts of data, threatening the user's security. A digital
signature reveals the identity of the user in any transaction whereas a blind
signature protects the user's privacy.
1.1 Blind Signature
Blind signature as introduced by David Chaum [1] is a form of digital signature
in which the content of a message is blinded before it is signed. It allows a user
to acquire a signature from the signer without revealing the message content for
personal privacy. The resulting blind signature can be publicly veried against
the original, unblinded message in the manner of a regular digital signature. In
a blind signature scheme, the signer cannot link the relationship between the
blind message and the signature of the chosen message. Blind signatures are
typically employed in privacy-related protocols where the signer and message
author are dierent parties [1,5]. Blind signature schemes have applications where
the sender A (the customer) does not want the signer B (the bank) to be capable
of associating a postiori message m and a signature SBlind(m) to a specic instance
of the protocol. This may be important in electronic cash applications where a
message m might represent a monetary value that A can spend. When m and
SBlind(m) are represented to B for payment, B is unable to deduce which party
was originally given the signed value. This allows A to remain anonymous so that
spending patterns cannot be monitored.
1.2 Proxy Signature
A proxy signature protocol introduced by Mambo et al. [2], allows a designated
person, called a proxy signer, to sign on behalf of an original signer, in case of
saying, temporal absence, lack of time or computing power, etc. When a receiver
veries a proxy signature, he veries the signature itself and original signer's
delegation together. The basic methodology of proxy signature is that the original
signer creates a signature on delegation information (ID of the proxy signer, or any
2
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warrant information) and gives it secretly to the proxy signer, and then the proxy
signer uses it as a proxy private key or uses it to generate a proxy private key.
Because the proxy key pair is generated from the original signer's signature on
delegation information, any verier can check the original signer's agreement from
a proxy signature [4, 15]. Once the proxy signer creates a valid proxy signature
of the original signer, the proxy signer cannot repudiate his signature creation
against anyone, and the original signer cannot deny that he delegates his signing
power to the proxy signer.
Delegations of various kinds are very common in society. Delegation of signing
power is one of them. Based on the dierent types of delegation Mambo et
al. [2] classied proxy signature schemes into full delegation, partial delegation,
delegation by warrant.
1.2.1 Full Delegation
In the full delegation, a proxy signer is given the same secret s that an original
signer has, so that she can create the same signature as original signer creates.
Obviously, when the proxy signer deliberately signs a document unfavorable for
the original signer, her mischievous action is not detected because the signature
created by the proxy signer is indistinguishable from the signatures created by the
original signer.
1.2.2 Partial Delegation
In the partial delegation, a new secret d is created from s, which follows the
modication of a verication equation, and d is given to a proxy signer in a
secure way. The created signature is checked by the modied equation, but not
by the original equation. That implies a signature created by the proxy signer is
distinguishable from a signature created by the original signer, and the original
signer, who has found a signed document with the content unfavorable for him, can
distinguish his ordinary signature from a proxy signature for partial delegation.
A proxy signature for each proxy is distinct. In this delegation, only the public
3
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key of the original signer is required for the verication.
Two common classications [4, 7, 8] are:
Proxy unprotected proxy signature
Besides proxy signer, original signer can create a valid proxy signature. But no
third party, not designated as proxy signer, can create a valid proxy signature.
Proxy protected proxy signature
Only the proxy signer can able to create a valid proxy signature. No one other
than proxy signer, not even the original signer can create a valid proxy signature.
1.2.3 Delegation by Warrant
A warrant is a certicate composed of a message part that the proxy signer is
authorized to sign and a public key which ensures the involvement of the original
signer.
There are two types of schemes for this purpose [2]:
Delegate Proxy
In delegate proxy, original signer, Alice, signs a warrant and declares Bob as
designated proxy signer, under her secret key by an ordinary signature scheme.
The warrant so created is given to Bob. Now Bob when wants to sign a message
on behalf of Alice, he simply signs the message by his own key and combines the
warrant with the message. Warrant is only identity which dierentiate between
Bob's normal signature and proxy signature.
Bearer Proxy
In bearer proxy, an original signer computes a proxy secret key and its
corresponding public key. Original signer signs a warrant, composed of a condition
4
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of authorization and newly generated public key. The secret key is given to proxy
signer in a secure way.
Proxy signature schemes can be constructed for each of these delegation types.
The partial delegation, and the delegation by warrant are more secure than
the full delegation. The partial delegation has a computational advantage over
the schemes with warrant. On the other hand delegation by warrant can be
implemented by ordinary signature schemes without any modication, and it is
appropriate for restricting the documents to be signed.
1.3 Proxy Blind Signature
The proxy signature and blind signature have respective advantages. In some real
situations, we need to inherit the merits of both proxy and blind signatures. The
rst proxy blind signature was proposed by Lin et al. [6] in 2000. Proxy blind
signature scheme is a digital signature scheme that combines the properties of
both proxy signature and blind signature. In a proxy blind signature scheme,
the proxy signer is allowed to generate a blind signature on behalf of the original
signer. In the proxy signature scheme, the proxy signer knows the original message
m, but in the proxy blind signature scheme, the proxy signer does not know the
m. Proxy blind signature scheme is a protocol played by two parties in which a
user obtains a proxy signer's signature for a desired message and the proxy signer
learns nothing about the message [5-13,18,19].
1.4 Security Requirements of Proxy Blind
Signature
The proxy blind signature satises the security properties of both the blind
signature and the proxy signature, such signature is suitable for many applications
where the users privacy and proxy signature are required.
5
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1.4.1 Distinguishability
The proxy signature must be distinguishable from the normal signature.
1.4.2 Nonrepudiation
Neither the original signer nor the proxy signer must be able to sign in place of
other party. They cannot deny their signatures against anyone.
1.4.3 Unforgeability
Only a designated proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature for the original
signer. (Even the original signer cannot do it).
1.4.4 Veriability
The receiver of the signature should be able to verify the proxy signature in a
similar way to the original signer.
1.4.5 Identiability
Anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a proxy
signature.
1.4.6 Prevention of Misuse
It should be condent that proxy key pair should be used only for creating proxy
signature, which conforms to delegation information. In case of any misuse of
proxy key pair, the responsibility of proxy signer should be determined explicitly.
1.4.7 Unlinkability
When the signature is veried, the signer knows neither the message nor the
signature associated with the signature scheme.
6
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1.5 Motivation
The motivation for this project came from the growing need for a proxy blind
signature scheme which can assure maximum possible security from the existing
schemes. In cases where the proxy signer abuses her/his delegated rights, the
original signer needs to revoke the proxy signer's signing capability. Proxy signer
can make fool the verier by signing the message after the delegation period is
over.
1.6 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes about the
literature surveys that have been done during the research work. The Tan et al.
scheme [7], Lal et al. scheme [8], Xue et al. scheme [12] and Yang et al. scheme [34]
are discussed here in detail. Chapter 3 describes the mathematics of cryptography.
Discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and cryptographic hash functions are discussed
here. Chapter 4 describes about the proposed signature scheme. In chapter 5, a
new e-voting protocol based on the proxy blind signature is discussed.
7
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Literature Review
2.1 Related Work
On the basis of Schnorr blind signature, Tan et al. [7] proposed the concept of
proxy blind signature, having the advantages of both the proxy signature and the
blind signature. This scheme was based on the discrete logarithm problem. Later,
Lal et al. [8] pointed out that Tan et al.'s proxy blind signature scheme suer
from a kind of forgery attack due to the signature receiver. Compared with Tan
et al.'s scheme, Lal et al. further proposed a more ecient and secure proxy blind
signature scheme to overcome the pointed out drawback in Tan et al.'s scheme.
Sun et al. [9] show that Tan et al.'s scheme does not satisfy the unforgeability
and unlinkability properties. In addition, they also point out that Lal et al.'s
scheme does not possess the unlinkability property. But they did not give an
improved scheme to overcome the insecurity. Wang et al. [10] demonstrated that
Tan et al.'s scheme was insecure and proposed two eective attacks. Later, wang
et al. [11] showed three security threats in Tan et al.'s scheme and proposed the
remedy for that. In 2004, Xue et al. [12] showed there exists one weakness in
Tan et al.'s scheme and Lal et al.'s scheme since the proxy signer can get the link
between the blind message and the signature or plaintext with great probability.
Xue et al. introduced concept of strong unlinkability and they also proposed a
proxy blind signature scheme. Compared with Tan et al.'s scheme and Lal et
8
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al.'s scheme, their scheme is more ecient. However, Li et al. [13] showed xue
et al.'s scheme cannot satisfy unforgeability and strong unlinkability properties.
Later, Yang et al. [34] proposed an ecient proxy blind signature scheme based
on discrete logarithmic problem and proved that their scheme is more secure and
ecient than other existing schemes.
2.2 Review of Tan et al. Shceme
For the convenience of describing the scheme, the following parameters are dened
as follows:
Alice : Original Signer
Bob : Proxy Signer
R : Receiver
p : a large prime number
q : a prime factor of p-1
g : an element of Zp
xA; xB; xR 2 Zq : the original signer Alice's secret key,the proxy signer Bob's
secret key, the receiver R's secret key.
yA  gxA(mod p) : Alice's public key
yB  gxB(mod p) : Bob's public key
yR  gxR(mod p) : R's public key
H(.) : a public cryptographically strong hash function
jj : which denotes the concatenation of strings
9
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2.2.1 Proxy Phase
Commission Generation
Alice randomly chooses k 2 Zq and computes
r = g
k (mod p) (2.1)
s = xAr + k (mod p) (2.2)
Proxy Delivery
Alice gives the pair (r; s) to the proxy signer, Bob via secure channel.
Proxy Verication
Bob checks,
gs = ryrA (mod p) (2.3)
which is often called as delegation function. If it is correct, Bob accepts and
computes
s0 = s+ xB (mod p) (2.4)
2.2.2 Signing Phase
Bob chooses a random number, k 2 Zq , and computes
t = gk (mod p) (2.5)
and sends (r; t) to the receiver R. R chooses two random numbers a; b 2 Zq , and
computes
10
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r = tgby a bB (ry
r
A)
 a (mod p) (2.6)
e = H(rjjm) (mod q) (2.7)
u = (ryrA)
 e+by eA (mod p) (2.8)
e = e  a  b (mod q) (2.9)
if r=0, then R needs to select a new tuple (a,b) otherwise, R delivers e to the
proxy B.
After receiving e, Bob computes
s00 = es0 + k (mod q) (2.10)
then Bob sends s00 to R.
2.2.3 extraction phase
While receiving s00, R computes
s = b+ s00 (mod q) (2.11)
Then, the proxy blind signature is the tuple(m,u,s,e).
2.2.4 Verication
The recipient of a proxy blind signature can verify its validity by checking that
e
?
= H(gsy eB y
e
Aujjm) (mod q) (2.12)
2.3 Security Analysis of Tan et al. Proxy Blind
Signature Scheme
In this section, the security shortcomings of Tan et al. scheme are analyzed.
11
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2.3.1 The original signer's universal forgery attack
A malicious original signer can forge a proxy blind signature [11,14] by computing
gsy eB y
e
Au(mod p) = tg
b(yr
0
A r
0) ay a bB (mod p) (2.13)
By computing using (2.5) to (2.11), he has
gsy eB y
e
Au(mod p) = g
b+s00y eB y
e
A(y
r0
A r
0) e+by eA (mod p) (2.14)
= tgbg(e a b)s
0
Ay eB (y
r0
A r
0) e+b (mod p) (2.15)
So, (2.13) follows from the equation
g(e a b)s
0
Ay eB (y
r0
A r
0) e+b(mod p) = (yr
0
A r
0) ay a bB (mod p) (2.16)
By simplifying further (2.16), he has
gs
0
A(mod p) = (yr
0
A r
0)yB (mod p) (2.17)
The malicious original signer can easily create suitable s0A and r
0,
(For example, he chooses randomly v 2 Zq , then creates r0 = y 1B gv (mod p) and
s0A = xAr
0 (mod q) ) by using (2.17), then he can forge a proxy blind signature
using s0A .
2.3.2 The receiver's universal forgery attack
After receiving the valid signature (m,u,s,e) on message m, suppose a receiver R
wants to forge a valid proxy blind signature (m0; s0; s; ef ) on messagem0 he chooses
arbitrarily [8, 11,15], he perform as follows.
computes ef = H(rjjm0) (mod q)
computes u', R can get u' by computing the following equation
gsy
 ef
B y
ef
A u
0(mod p) = tgby a bB (y
r
A)
 a (mod p) (2.18)
By computing using (2.5) to (2.11), he has
gsy
 ef
B y
ef
A u
0(mod p) = ge
s0+k+by
 ef
B y
ef
A u
0 (mod p) (2.19)
= tgb(yrAr)
e a bye a bB y
 ef
B y
ef
A u
0 (mod p) (2.20)
12
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So, (2.18) follows from the equation
tgb(yrAr)
e a bye a bB y
 ef
B y
ef
A u
0 (mod p) = tgby a bB (y
r
Ar)
 a (mod p) (2.21)
By simplifying further (2.21), he has
u0 = (yrAr)
 e+byef eB y
 ef
A (mod q) (2.22)
Therefore, R can forge a valid signature (m0; u0; s; ef ) on message m0 he chooses
arbitrarily.
2.3.3 Linkability Attack
Suppose the proxy signer Bob holds the signature sig(m) on blind message m and
related parameters, he can gure out the random numbers a and b by (2.9) and
(2.11) after knowing a proxy signature tuple (m,u,s,e) [11, 15]. Here a and b are
random numbers secretly chosen by the user, which should not be known to others
in a blind signature scheme due to the blindness requirement.
2.4 Review of Lal et al. Scheme
The notations are same as the previous scheme (Tan et al. scheme). The proposed
scheme is divided into three phases.
2.4.1 Proxy Phase
Proxy Generation
The original signer, Alice randomly chooses k 2 Zq , k 6= 1 and computes
r = gk (mod p) (2.23)
s = xA + kr (mod q) (2.24)
yp = g
syB (mod p) (2.25)
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Proxy Delivery
The original signer, Alice sends (s; r) to the proxy signer, Bob in a secure way and
makes yp public.
Proxy Verication
After receiving (s; r) the proxy signer, Bob checks the validity of the following
congruence
yp = g
s = yAr
r (mod p) (2.26)
If (s; r) satises this congruence, he accepts it and computes
s = s+ xB (mod q) (2.27)
as his/her proxy private key.
2.4.2 Signing Phase
Bob chooses a random number k 2 Zq , k 6= 1 , and computes
t = gk (mod p) (2.28)
and sends it to the receiver, R.
R chooses randomly ;  2 Zq and computes
r0 = tg y p (mod p) (2.29)
If r'=0, he chooses another set of  and ; otherwise computes
e0 = H(r0 m) (mod q) (2.30)
e = e0 +  (mod p) (2.31)
and R sends e to Bob.
After receiving e, Bob computes
s0 = k   se (mod q) (2.32)
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and sends it to receiver, R.
Now R computes,
sp = s
0    (mod q) (2.33)
The tuple (m,sp; e
0) is the proxy blind signature.
2.4.3 Verication Phase
The verier or recipient of the proxy blind signature computes
e00 = H(gspye
0
p (mod p)m) (mod q) (2.34)
Here, e00 = e0, if and only if the tuple (m,sp; e0) is a valid proxy signature.
2.5 Security Analysis of Lal et al. Scheme
In this section the attacks on Lal et al. Sheme are analyzed.
2.5.1 Linkability Attack
For the proxy signer, in order to identify the relationship between the revealed
message and the blind information, the proxy signer records all messages he owned,
such as t(s), e(s), and s0(s). After a signature (m, s, e0) is revealed, the proxy signer
computes
a0 = s0   s (2.35)
b0 = e  e0 (2.36)
r0 = gsye
0
pr (mod p) (2.37)
for some s0 2 s0(s) and e 2 e(s).
Finally, the proxy signer checks the equation
r0 = tg a
0
y b
0
p (mod p); for some t 2 t(s) (2.38)
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If he nds a corresponding t such that r0 = tg a
0
y b
0
p (mod p), therefore, the proxy
signer knows that (t,e,s0), is the related blind information corresponding to the
revealed message m. So, Lal et al's proxy blind signature does not possess the
unlinkability property [12].
2.5.2 Attack on the publishing of the proxy public key
In order to verify a proxy signature, the proxy public key is obtained by computing,
while not retrieving from original signers publishing. The computed proxy public
key has the meaning of conrming the relationship between a original signer and a
proxy signer. In Lal and Awasthis scheme, such a publishing enables an adversary
who obtained the proxy public key to republish it again. Finally, the adversary
claims that he is the original signer. Therefore, the publishing of proxy public key
suers from the security aw that the original signer is unable to be authenticated
exactly [9].
2.6 Review of Xue et al. Scheme
In 2004, Xue et al. [12]. proposed a new proxy protected proxy blind signature
scheme with warrant. In this scheme, the CA (Certicate Authority) is needed.
Its task is to manage the public directory in the system and certify users' public
keys. The scheme is divided into the following subsections:
2.6.1 Proxy Phase
Proxy Generation
Original signer, Alice selects k 2 Zq at random and computes
r = g
k (2.39)
s = k + xAH(mw; r) (mod q) (2.40)
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Proxy Delivery
Alice sends the pair (mw; r; s) to the proxy signer B.
2.6.2 Proxy Verication
Bob checks whether the following equation holds or not.
gs = ry
H(mw;r)
A (mod p) (2.41)
If it holds, Bob continues to compute
s0 = s+ xByB (mod q) (2.42)
yp = g
s0 (2.43)
= gsyyBB (mod p) (2.44)
= ry
H(mw;r)
A y
yB
B (mod p) (2.45)
as his/her secret and public proxy signature key, respectively.
2.6.3 Signing Phase
Bob selects k 2 Zq at random, and computes
t = gk (mod p) (2.46)
and then sends t to the receiver R.
R chooses two random integers a; b 2 Zq , and calculates
r = tg ay bp (mod p) (2.47)
If r=0, R rechooses a and b. Once r, a, and b are determined, the receiver R
computes
e0 = H(rjjm) (mod q) (2.48)
e = e0 + b (mod q) (2.49)
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Then R delivers e to the proxy signer B.
After receiving e, B calculates
s00 = k   s0e (mod q) (2.50)
Then, B sends (mw; r; s
00) to receiver R.
2.6.4 Extraction Phase
While receiving s00, R computes
s =s00   a (mod q) (2.51)
S =gs (mod p) (2.52)
Then, the proxy blind signature is the tuple (m;mw; r; S; e
0).
2.6.5 Verication Phase
From mw, the recipient of a proxy blind signature can get the public keys of the
original signer and proxy signer, the delegation time, etc. Then he/she, can get
the public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer from CA.
The recipient of a proxy blind signature can conrm its validity by checking that
e0 ?= H(S(ryH(mw;r)A y
yB
B )e
0(mod p)jjm) (mod q) (2.53)
2.7 Security Analysis of Xue et al. Scheme
In 2005, Li et al. [13] proved that Xue et al. scheme failed to satisfy the
unforgeability and strong unlinkability property.
2.8 Review of Yang et al. Scheme
In 2008, Yang et al. [34] proposed a new proxy blind signature scheme, which
satised all the security requirements of both the blind signature scheme and the
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proxy signature scheme.
Here it is assumed that the proxy signer, Bob will blind sign a message m on
behalf of the original signer Alice, the receiver is R.
The proposed scheme is divided into into ve phases:
1. system setup
2. proxy designate
3. blind signing
4. signature extraction
5. signature verication
2.8.1 System Setup
The parameters are dened as follows:
Alice : Original signer
Bob : Proxy signer
R : Receiver
p, q : two large prime numbers, such that q j p-1
g : an element of Zq , its order is q.
mw : the designated proxy warrant which contains the identities information of
the original signer and the proxy signer, message type to be signed by the proxy
signer, the delegation limits of authority, valid periods of delegation, etc.
xA ; xB 2 Zq : the original signer Alice's secret key, the proxy signer Bob's secret
key.
yA = g
xA (mod p) : Alice's public key.
yB = g
xB (mod p) : Bob's public key.
H(.), h(.) : public cryptographically strong hash functions.
jj : the concatenation of strings.
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2.8.2 Proxy Designation
Alice selects k 2 Zq , and computes
K = g
k (mod p) (2.54)
s = xA + k:H(mwjjk) (mod q) (2.55)
Alice sends (K; s) along with the warrant mw to the proxy signer Bob via a secure
channel.
Bob checks the equation
gs = yAK
H(mwjjK) (mod p) (2.56)
If it is correct, Bob accepts the proxy task and computes
s0 = s+ xB (2.57)
as his proxy blind signature secret key.
2.8.3 Blind Signing
Bob selects k 2 Zq , and computes
t = gk (mod p) (2.58)
and then sends (K,t) to the receiver R. R randomly selects two numbers a; b 2 Zq ,
and computes
r = ta(yAyBK
H(mwjjK))ab (mod p) (2.59)
e = h(mjjr) (mod q) (2.60)
e0 = a 1e+ b (mod q) (2.61)
If r=0, R has to select a new tuple (a,b). R sends e0 to Bob.
After receiving e0, Bob computes
s00 = e0s0 + k (2.62)
and sends the signed messages s00 to R.
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2.8.4 Signature Extraction
After receiving s00, receiver R computes
s = gs"a (mod p) (2.63)
Finally, the proxy blind signature scheme is the tuple (m, mw, s, e, K).
2.8.5 Signature Verication
The verier can verify the validity of the proxy blind signature by checking that
e = h(mjjs (yAyBKH(mwjjK)) e) (mod q) (2.64)
2.9 Security Analysis of Yang et al. Scheme
The Yang et al. proxy blind signature scheme is not secure against forgeability
attack. An attacker can create a valid proxy blind signature instead of the
designated proxy signer.
2.9.1 Forgeability Attack
An attacker, E can produce a proxy signature instead of Bob, who is delegated by
the original signer Alice. The attacker go through the following steps to produce
a valid proxy blind signature.
• Step 1. E chooses a forged message m0 to be signed by him/her.
• Step 2. E randomly selects two integers k, k0 2 Zp .
• Step 3. E then computes the followings
K 0 = gk
0
(mod p) (2.65)
t0 = gk (mod p) (2.66)
e0 = h(m0jjt0) (mod q) (2.67)
s0 = t0:(yAyBK 0H(mwjjK
0))e
0
(mod p) (2.68)
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• Step 4. The forged blind signature on message m0 is (m0;mw; s0; e0; K 0).
The generated forged blind signature is valid and it can be veried by the verier
Bob as follows:
h(m0jjs0(yAyBK 0H(mwjjK0)) e0) (mod q)
=h(m0jjt0(yAyBK 0H(mwjjK0))e0)(yAyBK 0H(mwjjK0)) e0 (mod q)
=h(m0jjt0) (mod q)
=e0
It is proved that an attacker can produce the proxy blind signature on the forged
message m0 [14, 19]. So, Yang et al. scheme is not secure against forgeability
attack.
2.10 Observation
So nally it has been observed that, the proxy blind signature schemes stated
above failed to satisfy all the security properties of proxy blind signature scheme
that are discussed in the Introduction chapter. So the objective is to propose a
new proxy blind signature scheme with minimum computational cost and it should
satisfy all the security requirements of a proxy blind signature.
2.11 Problem Denition
During the verication of a proxy blind signature scheme the verier cannot know
whether signing (done by proxy signer) is within the delegation period or not.
Proxy signer can make fool to the verier by signing the message or document
after the delegation period is over as there is no such provision to record the time
stamp during the proxy signing phase. Original signer cannot revoke the delegation
whenever necessary, so that a proxy signer may misuse the delegating power for
signing. Hence, it is necessary to provide a time stamp during the signing phase
of the proxy blind signature and to allow the original signer to revoke delegating
power whenever necessary.
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2.12 Objective
The objectives are:
• To design a new proxy blind signature scheme with proxy revocation.
• To provide a time stamp in the signing phase so that a verier can know the
signing was done within the delegation period.
• To compare the proposed scheme with the existing scheme based on eciency
and computational time.
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Mathematical Background
3.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
The Discrete Logarithm Problem is a critical problem in number theory, and is
similar in many ways to the integer factorization problem. Discrete logarithms
were used mainly in computations of nite elds and elliptic curves. Discrete
logarithm problem has signicant importance in the eld of cryptography as the
complexity lies in solving the discrete logarithm problem. If it were possible
to compute discrete logs eciently, it would be possible to break numerous
thought-to-be unbreakable cryptographic schemes. To dene a discrete logarithm
one picks an element g in the eld and then one picks a secret random integer x
and one computes h = gx in the eld. The discrete logarithm problem is given g
and h, nd x.
Discrete Logarithm Problem is a good source of a one-way function. A one-way
function as a function f : X ! Y for which given x 2 X it is easy to compute f(x);
however, given y 2 Y ; it is dicult to compute a value x 2 X such that f(x)=y, at
least for most values of y. In other words, the function f is not invertible, without
further information, and it is for this reason that such function is otherwise known
as a trapdoor function.
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3.2 Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function takes a message of arbitrary length and creates a
message digest of xed length such that any (accidental or intentional) change to
the message will change the hash value (message digest) with very high probability.
The ideal cryptographic hash function has four main properties:
• It is easy to compute the hash value for any given message.
• It is infeasible to generate a message that has a given hash.
• It is infeasible to modify a message without changing the hash.
• It is infeasible to nd two dierent messages with the same hash.
In various standards and applications, the two most commonly used hash functions
are MD5 and SHA-1.
The MD5 function is a cryptographic algorithm that takes an input of arbitrary
length and produces a message digest that is 128 bits long. The digest is sometimes
also called the "hash" or "ngerprint" of the input. MD5 is used in many situations
where a potentially long message needs to be processed and/or compared quickly.
The most common application is the creation and verication of digital signatures.
SHA-1 is a widely used cryptographic hash function developed by the NSA. It's
result is usually expressed as a 160 bit hex number. SHA-1 is widely considered
the successor to MD5.
3.3 Group
A group is a nite or innite set of elements together with a binary operation
(called the group operation) that together satisfy the four fundamental properties
of closure, associativity, the identity property, and the inverse property. The
operation with respect to which a group is dened is often called the group
operation, and a set is said to be a group under this operation. Elements a,
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b, c , ... of a set G with binary operation between a and b denoted a*b form a
group G if the following four properties are satised,
1. Closure
If a and b are two elements in G, then a*b is also in G. It's called closed
because from inside the group, we can't get outside of it.
2. Associativity
For all a, b, and c in G, a * (b * c) = (a * b) * c.
It means that the order in which we do operations doesn't matter.
3. Identity
There exists an identity element e in the set G, such that a * e = a
and e * a = a, for all elements a in G. There is only one identity element for
every group.
4. Inverse
If we have an element of the group, there is another element of the group
such that when we use the operator on both of them, we get e, the identity.
For all a in G, there exists b in G, such that a * b = e and b * a = e.
Order
The order jGj of a nite group G is the number of elements of G.
The order of an element g in a group is the least positive integer k such that gk is
the identity.
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Proposed Proxy Blind Signature
Scheme
In this chapter a new and improved proxy blind signature scheme with proxy
revocation is proposed which satises all the security requirements of the proxy
blind signature scheme. The proposed scheme also records the time stamp of the
signing phase so that a verier can get sure that the signing is done within the
delegation period.
4.1 Proposed Scheme
The proposed scheme is divided into following phases:
1. System parameter initialization
2. Proxy delegation
3. Blind signing
4. Signature extraction
5. Signature verication
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4.1.1 System Parameter Initialization
The parameters used in the proposed scheme are:
Alice : Original Signer
Bob : Proxy Signer
R : Signature Requester
AS : Authentication Server as trusted third party
p, q : two large prime numbers such that, qjp  1
g : an element of order q in Zp
xA; xB; xR 2 Zq : the original signer Alice's secret key, the proxy signer Bob's
secret key, and R's secret key respectively.
yA = g
xA(mod p) : Original signer Alice's public key
yB = g
xB(mod p) : Proxy signer Bob's public key
yR = g
xR(mod p) : Receiver R's public key
H(.) : a cryptographically secure one way hash function
jj : which denote the concatenation of two strings
mw : message warrant
m : message
4.1.2 Proxy Delegation
The original signer Alice randomly picks out k 2 Zq and computes,
r = g
k (mod p) (4.1)
s = xA + k:H(mwjjr) (mod q) (4.2)
Alice sends (r, s) along with the message warrant mw to the proxy signer Bob and
AS, via a secure channel.
The proxy signer Bob, then veries the equation
gs = yAr
H(mwjjr)(mod p) (4.3)
If it is correct, Bob accepts and computes,
spr = s+ xByA (4.4)
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as his/her proxy blind signature secret key.
4.1.3 Blind Signing
Proxy signer, Bob randomly selects an integer k 2 Zq , and computes
t = gk+xB(mod p) (4.5)
Bob, then sends (r, t, mw) to the receiver R.
R checks Alice's and Bob's identities and the delegation lifetime of the warrant
mw.
If the above checking is successful,
R selects two random numbers u; v 2 Zq and computes
r0 = tgu+xRyvpr (mod p) (4.6)
where xR is the private key of R and ypr = g
spr (mod p)
e = H(r0jjm) (mod q) (4.7)
e = v   e (mod q) (4.8)
If r0=0, then R needs to select a new tuple (u, v) otherwise, R sends e to Bob
and AS.
For signing blinded message, Bob must request a time stamp for the message.
Bob transmits his identity and (s, mw, t) to AS. AS checks whether the received
s from Bob and the received s from Alice is identical. If these two are same then
AS checks
gs = yAr
H(mwjjr)(mod p) (4.9)
If it satises, AS goes through the following steps:
1. It is still in the valid proxy delegation specied in mw.
2. r is not in the revocation list. If r is in the revocation list, then it means
that the delegation is revoked.
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After that, AS chooses a random number ks 2 Zq and computes
rs = g
ks (mod p) (4.10)
T = H(rs jj time stamp jj e) (mod p) (4.11)
AS sends T to the proxy signer Bob and receiver R.
After receiving T, the proxy signer Bob computes,
s0 = k + espr + T (4.12)
as the signed message and sends it to the receiver R.
4.1.4 Signature Extraction
After receiving s0 from Bob, the receiver R computes,
s = gu+s
0 T (mod p) (4.13)
Thus, the proxy blind signature on message m is the tuple (m;mw; s
; e).
4.1.5 Signature Verication
Verier can verify the proxy blind signature by checking whether
e
?
= H(syByRyeprjjm) (mod q) (4.14)
4.1.6 Revocation Phase
If original signer Alice wants to revoke the delegation before the specied
delegation period , then Alice ask AS to put r in the revocation list. During
the computation of T, AS checks the validity of delegation period specied in the
proxy warrant mw and the revocation list. If it is within the valid delegation
period and r is not found in the revocation list, AS computes T, sends it to Bob
and R for the message. If r is in the revocation list then AS does not compute T.
Hence, the proxy signer, Bob cannot sign. r in the revocation list can be removed
after the delegation period is over. Therefore, the size of the revocation list will
not be unlimited.
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4.2 Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
1. If the original signer have an intention to forge a proxy blind signature with
forgery attack for the message m0, he/she has to create a secret key s0pr and
calculate
y0A = g
s0pr (mod p) (4.15)
Consequently, the original signer must compute
syByRyepr (mod p) = tg
u+xRyvpr (mod p) (4.16)
By using the equation (4.5) to (4.10), the original signer has
gu+s
0 T+xB+xRyepr(mod p) = tg
u+xRyvpr (mod p) (4.17)
) gv es0pr(mod p) = yv epr (mod p) (4.18)
To nd the value of s0pr original signer must nd a solution to the above
equation (4.15) which is a discrete logarithm problem. Thus, the original
signer fails to forge a signature.
2. The receiver can not forge the signature after receiving (m;mw; s
; e) on
message m. When a receiver tries to forge a signature (m0; s; e0) for message
m0, he/she must verify that the equation given below is correct.
syByRyepr (mod p) = tg
u+xRyvpr (mod p) (4.19)
By using the the equations(4.5) to (4.10) he has
syByRyepr (mod p) = g
u+s0 TgxBgxRye
0
pr (mod p) (4.20)
= gu+s
0 T+xB+xRgspre
0
(mod p) (4.21)
= tgu+(v e)spr+xRgspre
0
(mod p) (4.22)
= tgu+xRyvpr (4.23)
From the above we can get,
g(v e)sprgspre
0
(mod p) = gsprv (mod p) (4.24)
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This cannot hold true, as e 6= e0. Therefore the receiver fails to forge a valid
proxy blind signature on message m0.
3. The proxy linkability holds if there is a conjunction between (t; e; s0) and
(m;mw; s
; e). t is only in equation (4.6) and relate to e through equation
(4.7). Proxy signer cannot nd out the value of t as it is masked by
two random numbers u and v. Hence, the proposed scheme satises the
unlinkability property.
4. As the proxy blind signature (m;mw; s
; e) on the message m, contains
mw(message warrant) anyone can easily dierentiate between the proxy blind
signature and normal signature. Hence, it satises the distinguishability
property.
5. From the warrantmw, anyone can mark original signer and proxy signer. On
the other hand, as the verication equation contains the public key of the
proxy signer and original signer, one can identify them. As a result, anyone
can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer from a proxy
signature. Hence, it satises identiability property.
6. The original signer cannot get the proxy signer's secret key, and similarly
the proxy signer cannot get the original signer's secret key. So, one cannot
sign on behalf of other. Hence, it satises the non repudiation property.
7. Due to the inclusion of the original signer and proxy signer identities
information, message type to be signed by the proxy signer, delegation
period, etc. in the warrant itself the proposed scheme is capable of preventing
proxy key pair misuse.
8. verication
The proposed scheme satises the property of veriability.
H(syByRyeprjjm) (mod q)
= H(sgxBgxRyeprjjm) (mod q)
= H(gs
0+u T+xB+xRyepr jjm) (mod q)
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= H(gk+xB+u+xR+e
spryepr jjm) (mod q)
= H(gk+xB+u+xR+(v e)spryepr jjm) (mod q)
= H(gk+xB+u+xR+sprv spreyepr jj m) (mod q)
= H(gk+xB+u+xR+sprvyepry
 e
pr jj m) (mod q)
= H(gk+xB+u+xR+sprv jj m) (mod q)
= H(gk+xBgu+xRyvpr jj m) (mod q)
= H(tgu+xRyvprjjm) (mod q)
= H(r0jjm) (mod q)
=e
4.3 Eciency Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Let M and E denote computational load for multiplication and exponentiation
respectively. The computational load for addition is ignored due to its high
performance. The table given below gives the detail comparison of computational
loads of the proposed scheme with other existing schemes.
Schemes Proxy GenerationBlind SigningVerication Total
Tan et al. 4E+3M 7E+6M 3E+3M 14E+12M
Lal et al. 4E+3M 3E+3M 2E+M 9E+7M
Xue et al. 3E+3M 4E+3M 3E+3M 10E+9M
Yang et al. 3E+2M 5E+4M 2E+3M 10E+9M
Proposed Scheme 3E+3M 6E+3M E+3M 10E+9M
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A Secure E-voting Protocol
Based on Proxy Blind Signature
5.1 Introduction
Voting is a way for a voter to make a decision or express an opinion or to choose
a candidate. E-voting (Electronic voting) refers to both the electronics means
of casting a vote and the electronic means of counting and publishing that votes.
E-voting system has some specic advantages as compared to the traditional voting
system. Many people are not going to vote as because voting booth is far away
from their work place. The only solution to it is e-voting scheme. E-voting has
become increasingly popular in our technology driven world. It increases the
security of the ballot, speed up the processing of results and make voting easier.
E-voting also has the ability to reduce fraud, by eliminating the opportunity for
ballot tampering. Due to mobility and convenience, the most important properties
of e-voting, it is becoming more popular [26, 32,33].
In general, two main types of e-voting can be identied:
1. E-voting which is physically supervised by representatives of government or
independent electoral authorities. (e.g. electronic voting machines located
at polling stations)
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2. Remote e-voting where voting is performed within the voters sole inuence,
and is not physically supervised by representatives of government authorities.
(e.g. voting from one's personal computer, mobile phone)
E-voting is an election system that allows a voter to record his or her secure
and secret ballot electronically. E-voting can reduce election costs and increase
participation of voters by making the voting process more convenient.
5.2 Security Properties of E-voting
1. Completeness
In traditional voting scheme the voters identity is checked by seeing the voter
in person. But in e-voting, the voter has to pass a serial of authentication
procedures after that he/she is permitted to cast his/her vote. Completeness
property says that only authorized voters are eligible to vote.
2. Accuracy
A vote cannot be altered, cannot be eliminated from counting, invalid vote
should not be counted.
3. Uniqueness
A voter can vote exactly once, more than once is avoided.
4. Privacy
The denition of privacy states that no one can determine how an individual
voter gave its vote. Voters also cannot prove how they have voted, otherwise
they may sell their vote.
5. Reliability
During major failures (e.g. internet failure) the system should be robust
and no loss of vote should happen.
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6. Veriability
This property states that each voter can verify that their vote is correctly
counted.
7. Mobility
Mobility is one of the basic properties of important of e-voting. It states
that voters are not physically restricted to cast their vote.
8. Fairness
The properties of fairness states that, no one can get the voting result
before its publication phase. Fairness is always regarded as an essential
for preventing vote-buying.
9. Anonymity
The denition of anonymity in e-voting states that no one can link the voted
ballot to the voter who has cast that vote.
10. Convenience
It states that the voters cast their votes quickly and with minimal skills.
The system should be user friendly.
11. Robustness
The robustness property denes that no attacker or dishonest voter can
disturb or interrupt the voting process.
12. Eciency
The property of eciency states that the voting scheme should produce a
specic result eectively within a minimum amount of time and voters are
not required to wait for other voters to complete the process.
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5.3 Proposed Scheme
In the proposed scheme there are only four participants involved as follows:
1. Registration Authority (RA):
RA is a trusted party where all the eligible voter have to register in advance.
2. Administrator (A):
Administrator monitors the whole process of the voting scheme.
3. Vote Counter (VC):
VC has the responsibility to count the valid votes and publish the result.
4. Voter (Vi):
Voter is someone who is eligible to give the vote.
5.3.1 Structure of the Proposed Scheme
Figure 5.1: Structure of the proposed scheme
Every participants i.e. every voter, registration authority (RA), administrator
(A), and vote counter (VC) generate their public key and private key individually
in advance. Everyone get the public key of others from the certication authority
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(CA), by a secure authorized channel. The proposed scheme is divided into mainly
3 phases:
1. Registration
Voter Vi send an encrypted message to registration authority (RA)
requesting for registration. The message contains the ID of the voter
Vi. After receiving the message, registration authority (RA) veries the
authenticity of the sender Vi and check the voting right of voter Vi. RA
also checks that whether Vi has applied previously or not. With proper
verication the RA sends ballot papers to voter Vi.
2. Voting
Voter Vi lls the ballot, makes blind using blind signature technique and
sends to the administrator (A) to get his/her signature on the blinded ballot.
Administrator (A) signs the hidden ballot and returns back to the voter.
3. Counting
Voter Vi sends the signed ballot, hash value of unique number from RA to the
vote counter anonymously. After the voting deadline is over, vote counter
(VC) publishes the result.
5.3.2 Proposed Scheme in Detail
Registration
At the beginning, the voter Vi sends an encrypted message to RA by using
his secret key. The message contains ID of voter, a random number (rn), ID
of administrator, time stamp. After getting the message, RA rst checks the
authenticity of the message and then checks whether the voter Vi is eligible to vote
then RA checks whether Vi has applied for registration or it is rst time. If voter Vi
is authenticated properly, a unique vote numberNVi is generated by RA. Then RA
sends the encrypted message to voter Vi, ERAs(IDVi jj NVi jj rn 1 jj time stamp)
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Voting
The following parameters are used in this phase:
p, q : two large prime numbers such that, qjp  1
g : an element in Zp whose order is q
xC ; xA 2 Zq : the Vote Counter's secret key and the Administrator's secret key
respectively.
yC = g
xC (mod p) : Vote Counter's public key
yA = g
xA(mod p) : Administrator's public key
H(.) : a cryptographically secure one way hash function
jj : which denote the concatenation of two strings
vw : voting warrant
xV : voter Vi's private key
First the VC goes for a hand shake with the administrator (A) and A gets the key
for signing.
VC randomly selects k 2 Zq and computes,
r = g
k (5.1)
s = xC + k:H(vwjjr) (mod q) (5.2)
VC sends (r, s) along with the voting warrant vw to A via a secure channel.
Then, after receiving (r,s), A veries the equation
gs = yCr
H(vwjjr)(mod p) (5.3)
If it is correct, A accepts and computes,
spr = s+ xAyC (5.4)
As the key for signing the ballot of the voters.
A randomly select an integer k 2 Zq , and computes
t = gk+xA (mod p) (5.5)
A then sends (r, t) to the voter Vi
Then, Vi selects two random numbers a; b 2 Zq
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Voter Vi computes
r0 = tgaybpr (mod p) (5.6)
where, ypr = g
spr (mod p)
e = H(r0jjm) (mod q) (5.7)
e = b  e (mod q) (5.8)
If r0=0, then voter Vi needs to select a new tuple (a,b). Otherwise, voter Vi sends
e to A.
After receiving e, A computes
s0 = k + espr (5.9)
as the signed ballot and sends it to voter Vi.
After receiving s0 from A, Vi computes
s = gu+s
0
(mod p) (5.10)
Thus, the signature on voting ballot m becomes nally (m; vw; s
; e).
Counting
Encrypting with VC's public key, Vi sends (m; vw; s
; e) jj NVi) to VC.
VC veries,
e = H(syByepr jj m) (mod q) (5.11)
If it is satised, the vote is accepted and nal result is declared after the voting
deadline is over.
5.3.3 Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Completeness
The attacker cannot vote as a legal voter because during registration the voter
sends encrypted message to RA using his own private key. Again, in the counting
phase VC checks the signature from the administrator with the ballot. So, only
authorized voters can participate in the voting process.
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Uniqueness
Since RA issue a unique serial number to each legal voter only once, no voter
cannot vote twice. RA and VC can detect the duplicate votes from that unique
number.
Mobility
In this scheme the voter is not limited to voting in a particular voting booth. A
voter can vote through the internet.
Anonymity
Administrator signs the blind ballot and the voted ballot is sent in an anonymous
channel to vote counter. Hence the proposed scheme conrms this requirement.
Convenience
The proposed scheme does not require any additional requirement or does not
need any extra skills. Hence it is convenience.
Fairness
Only after the deadline VC publishes the result. So, no one can not get it early.
5.4 Summary
With the rapid development of internet technology, voting through internet is a
practical idea. In this scheme, a secure and ecient mechanism of electronic voting
is proposed using the proxy blind signature. It increases the security of the voting
system and also the impartiality factor is taken care. Hence, the proposed scheme
can be practically applied in large scale voting.
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Conclusion
This thesis introduces a time stamped proxy blind signature scheme based
on discrete logarithm problem(DLP) with the termination of delegation power.
Proposed scheme satises all the security requirements of a proxy blind signature:
distinguishability, nonrepudiation, unforgeability, veriability, identiability,
prevention of misuse, unlinkability. When an abuse of a proxy is conducted in
the proposed scheme, an original signer can identify the deviating proxy signer
and terminate the abused proxies before the specied delegation time. Therefore,
this scheme is suitable for many applications where the user's privacy and proxy
signature are required.
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